A world without cash

Max Raskin and David Yermack have a nice WSJ OpEd last week, "Preparing for a world without cash." The oped summarizes their related paper.

What would a government-backed digital currency look like? A country’s central bank would need to become a deposit-taking institution and hold accounts on behalf of citizens and businesses. All of their debits would be tracked on the central bank’s blockchain, a digital ledger resistant to tampering. The central bank would pay interest electronically by adjusting the balances of depositor accounts.

I'm a big fan of the idea of abundant interest-bearing electronic money, and that the Fed or Treasury should provide abundant amounts of it. (Some links below.) Two big reasons: First, we then get to live Milton Friedman's optimal quantity of money. If money pays interest, you can hold as much as you'd like. It's like running a car with all the oil it needs. Second, it is a key to financial stability. If all "money" is backed by the Treasury or Fed, financial crises and runs end. As Max and David say,

Depositors would no longer have to rely on commercial banks to hold their checking accounts, and the government could get out of the risky deposit-insurance business. Commercial banks that wished to keep making loans would raise long-term capital in the debt and equity markets, ending the mismatch between demand deposits and long-term loans that can cause liquidity problems.

However, there are different ways to accomplish this larger goal. Do we all need to have accounts directly at the Fed, and is a blockchain the best way for the Fed to handle transfers?


The point of the blockchain, as I understand it, is to demonstrate the validity of each "dollar" by keeping a complete encrypted record of its creation and each person who held it along the way.

Its archival blockchain links together all previous transfers of a given unit of currency as a method of authentication. The blockchain is known as a “shared ledger” or “distributed ledger,” because it is available to all members of the network, any one of whom can see all previous transactions into or out of other digital wallets

That, and a limited supply to control its value, was the basic idea of bitcoin. But when we are clearing transactions by transferring rights to accounts at the Fed, the validity of the "dollar" is not in question. It's at the Fed. And, the big advantage relative to bitcoin as I see it, the value of the dollar comes from monetary policy and ultimately the government's demand for "dollars" to be paid in taxes, not from a fixed supply as was the case with gold.

The blockchain also appears to clear transactions more quickly and offer some security advantages. The latter are very attractive -- in my personal life I've recently had the questionable pleasure of spending days enjoying 19th century finance of multi-day clearing times, obtaining notarized signatures and medallion guarantees, and sending pieces of paper around. But not yet ironclad -- The same week of the WSJ has a string of articles on the security of  Bitcoin following a recent hack.

The biggest stumbling block in my mind is "all members of the network, any one of whom can see all previous transactions into or out of other digital wallets." Per Max and David, this has pluses and minuses:

Tax collection would become much simpler, and tax evasion and money laundering could become prohibitively difficult.

Yet the centralization of banking under this system would also create a Leviathan with the power to monitor and control the personal finances of every citizen in the country. This is one of the chief reasons why many are loath to give up on hard currency. With digital money, the government could view any financial transaction and obtain a flow of information about personal spending that could be used against an individual in a whole host of scenarios. 

This really is a big change in how "money" works. Traditional cash has a lovely property, that it has no memory. Its physical properties determine its value in a way independent of its history. It is incredibly efficient, in a Hayek information sense. The economy does not need the memory of every transaction. Blockchains turn this around.

The anonymity of cash makes it enduringly popular -- cash holdings are up, not down in the digital age. The same week of WSJ reading had articles delving into the continuing popularity of cash, and the mechanics of handling it, the ongoing fury over the planeload of cash delivered by the Obama administration to Iran. It's not hard to figure out why both Iranians and Administration needed to send old-fahshioned bills on an unmarked plane, not a wire transfer.

Indeed creating this Leviathan is a danger, to the economy, and to our political freedom. Our government likes to pass aspirational laws that we don't really mean to enforce. Get rid of cash, and allow the government to see every transaction and enforce every law regarding payment of anything, and 11 million immigrants suddenly can't work at all and become penniless. Rigorous enforcement of all transactions would not only stop your kids lemonade stand and babysitting business, it would wipe out most of the employment opportunities for lower-income America. Many businesses would come to a halt.

The natural response is, well, maybe we shouldn't pass laws we don't really mean to enforce. Good luck with that.

More deeply,  "flow of information about personal spending that could be used against an individual in a whole host of scenarios" is truly frightening. I don't think there is a political candidate in the whole country who could not be embarrassed with one purchase at some point in their lives. Consider the brouhaha now over "disclosure" of political contributions -- there is a real fear that disclosure is a way of setting up hit lists for the administration to go after its political enemies. Multiply that by a thousand. Dissenters could easily be silenced if the government can monitor or block every transaction.

The ability to transact with anonymity and privacy has been a central freedom for hundreds of years. It's largely gone already. Losing it entirely and giving the government huge power to enforce any law it passes is not necessarily a good thing.

Mike and David opine

creating and respecting privacy firewalls and rethinking legal-tender laws could mitigate the dangers of monopoly and stifled competition in currency markets.

[Subject-free sentences (creating?) are always a sign of trouble!] The dangers are not of monopoly and competition, the dangers are in the vast loss of privacy that the government, and its leakers and hackers knowing all our transactions implies.

(Here I'm out on a limb on my blockchain knowledge, but I gather that one does have to wipe the slate clean occasionally. Otherwise, the blockchain gets ridiculously long. Imagine each dollar, a hundred years from now, attached to a list of everyone who has ever held it! That wiping out process could do a lot for privacy.)

So, back to basics. It is not at all clear to me in their analysis why the Fed has to manage all the accounts. The Fed, Treasury, and the government in general are very good at defining the units of a currency, and providing an easy standard of value -- cash, coins, liquid government debt, reserves.  That is their natural monopoly. I don't see that the government has a similar natural advantage in providing low-cost transactions services, especially on monitoring fraud in the use of those services. The Fed got hacked by employees of the central bank of Bangladesh.

So I leave with two big questions -- and these are questions, and this is an invitation to more thought.

Is a blockchain really better than accounts at the Fed, and instructions to flip a switch to send money from my account to your account? What is the best way to get low transactions costs and fraud prevention, given that we don't need authentication of the dollar itself and a supply limitation?

Is it really better for the Fed to handle all transactions directly, rather than for the Fed to provide clearing accounts, and "banks" (narrow!) to provide transactions services between people, using reserves as now for netting and clearing? The latter setup allows competition and innovation in transactions services, and a better hope for an information firewall retaining some privacy and anonymity in transactions.

(Note for readers new to the blog: I've written about some of these issues in  A new structure for US Federal Debt, Toward a run-free financial system, A blueprint for effective financial reform and previous blog posts, such as here.)

A Look in the Mirror

Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok have written a splendid article, "A Skeptical View of the National Science Foundation’s Role in Economic Research" in the summer Journal of Economic Perspectives. Many of their points apply to research support in general.

The article starts with classic Chicago-style microeconomics: What are the opportunity costs -- money may be helpful here, but what else could you do with it? What are the unexpected offsetting forces -- if the government subsidizes more, who subsidizes less? What is the whole picture -- how much public and private subsidy is there to economics research without the NSF? Too many good economists just say "economic research is a public good, the government should subsidize it."

They go on to ask deeper questions, "Are NSF Grants the Best Method of Government Support for Economic Science?" The NSF largely supports mainstream research by established economists at high-prestige universities. Are there better "public goods," undersupported by other means, for it to support?


Yes. Among others, replication and data. There are few current rewards for replication, and much economics research is not replicable. We live in the age of big data, but it's expensive and hard to access. The NSF has done commendable work here -- and other government agencies including the Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve, etc. provide huge public goods by collecting and disseminating good data. Without data we would not exist.  That strikes me as the single most underfunded public good in the economics sphere.

I'm less a fan of their proposal to support "far out" research, naming "post-Keynesians, econo-physicists, or the Austrians." While they cite popular authors  and a "gadfly'" sensational claims for the end of macroeconomics in 2009, in fact Macroeconomics is not all that much changed since the crisis and recession, and none of these claims -- nor the wackier approaches -- have in fact borne any fruit.  Yes, it's easy to support mediocre incremental research, but government agency that must appear impartial can too quickly end up subsidizing crank research, of which there is plenty in economics (see my inbox!)

They ask a great question. If the government wants to subsidize economic research, why hand out grants, rather than hire people directly?

I think there are good answers here. Another big subsidy to economics research which they do not mention are the legions of government employees already doing it. The Federal Reserve, Treasury, OFR, CEA, SEC, CFTC, HHS, EPA and hundreds of other agencies employ thousands of PhD economists who spend considerable if not full time on "research," and are expected to write academic journal articles. Make up your own mind about the value of this effort. The success of the research university I think points to an important externality between doing research, teaching it, and evaluating it through service to the profession. Also, research coming out of government agencies always seems to find just how wonderful those agencies' policies are. However, replication and data production, or other more easily guided research seems a good fit.

Also not mentioned is the danger that government subsidized research ends up being politicized, or at least ends up calling for more government.

One of the main methods of NSF support is "summer support." Universities pay academics on a 9 month basis. If you get an NSF grant it pays for 2 months of "summer support."  This is, of course, a fiction. In fact, most universities chop up the "9 month" salary into 12 pieces anyway. And most academics are not about to go work elsewhere in the summer -- it's the only time to really focus on research, and as Alex and Tyler point out the rewards to publishing are huge.  By and large the NSF does not (or did not when I last looked in to it) buy off teaching or other duties, the one thing that might free up some marginal research time. Alex and Tyler mention low labor supply elasticities as a reason to be cautious about the effectiveness of support. They don't mention this system, practically guaranteed to be a pure transfer rather than induce more research.

On the other hand, NSF grants are typically awarded based on a working paper. They already are a "prize" as Tyler and Alex recommend. So perhaps the lump-sum nature of the reward is not such a bad idea, and ends up subsidizing good research rather than more effort.

I stopped applying for NSF grants some time ago. Sometime in the mid-1990s, I was driving through Indiana, and I saw a guy hooking a shiny new boat up to his pickup truck. It occurred to me, my NSF check for that summer was worth about 5 boats. I didn't think I could get out of the car and say with a straight face that he and four neighbors should forego their boats so I could work on unit roots for the summer. I'm not pure either; I still benefit from many government subsidies, not least of which the tax-deductibility of charitable contributions.

Federalization of Labor

We are getting a good hint that a centerpiece of economic policy in the Hillary Clinton administration will be an increase in Federal control over labor markets.

The news here is that serious economists are advocating these policies, not just to transfer income from one to another, reduce inequality, help specific groups, or enhance some sense of social justice, at the expense of dynamism and growth, but that more Federal control of the labor market will increase wages, productivity and economic growth for everyone!

Alan Blinder's cogent Aug 2 Wall Street Journal opinion piece gives a good sense of the language and logic,

... Hillary Clinton has presented an extensive list of policies that would raise wages, starting with a higher minimum wage. ...

Mrs. Clinton also advocates widespread profit-sharing as a way to put more money into workers’ pockets. She would promote that goal both by using the presidential bully pulpit and by providing tax incentives for businesses that share profits. Since the scholarly evidence suggests that profit-sharing raises productivity, such tax breaks will partly pay for themselves.

Increased vocational training and apprenticeships for the non-college-bound are also major Clinton policies....The U.S. can increase its productivity and reduce inequality by ensuring that the right people get vocational training and apprenticeships.

And then there is what may be the surest way to raise wages over the long run: providing pre-K education for all American children....

Labor market intervention is getting wrapped up in "stimulus," as reported in an excellent Bloomberg column by Brendan Greeley here,

 "It’s really simple," she said at a rally in June in Ohio. "Higher wages leads to more demand, which leads to more jobs, which leads to higher wages." ...

When Clinton uses the word "demand" on the stump, she’s blowing a dog whistle. (Economists have them, too.) Increase demand, she’s saying, and you get growth.... 

Bob Gordon signs on reluctantly,  

"I think it’s a very marginal way of promoting economic growth," says Robert Gordon, economist at Northwestern University who specializes in the subject. Like Summers, he prefers a massive investment in infrastructure. But he does agree that a shift in business income away from profits and toward salaries would create growth. Workers are more likely to buy things from their paychecks than businesses are to invest out of their profits.

Alan Krueger ["former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and an informal adviser to the Clinton campaign," and candidate for vice-president of the American Economic Association] agrees wholeheartedly:

... "I think the time could be right for a more virtuous growth model," he said, "which is driven by stronger wage growth...more consumption, more demand, creating more jobs." 

Novel rationalizations for decades-old policies are always suspect. And the usual passive or verb-less sentences hiding the heavy hand of Federal government always invites skepticism.

But let's take it seriously. How much sense do these analyses make?

Without rehashing the whole minimum-wage fight, it is worth asking, if the Federal Government forces businesses to raise some people's wages, but others become unemployed as a result, whether that really count as raising wages overall?

The words "presidential bully pulipit" has poor overtones in the current age. The bully pulpit means the DOJ, EEOC, IRS, NLRB, EPA and who knows even the fish and wildlife service may come calling if you don't do what the president wants. Schoolyard bully, not Teddy Roosevelt's jolly-good pulpit.

"The scholarly evidence indicates that profit-sharing raises productivity.." That's a new twist on the abominable "studies show" argument by reference to vague authority.  But even "scholarly evidence" has to make some sense.

It does make sense that firms which study the question and choose profit-sharing plans can thereby raise productivity, either by giving their employees better incentives or by attracting different and more productive employees. They would not do it otherwise.

But this classic subject-free sentence is about Federal Regulations to force profit-sharing that "puts money into workers' pockets" on all firms. It does not follow that such a mandate will have the same effect. This is the classic, "rich guys drive BMWs, so if we force BMW to give cars away we'll all get rich."

To belabor the obvious, that some firms choose it because they see it will work does not mean that the Federal Government forcing it on all firms will work.  That profit sharing which increases workers' incentives can work does not mean that reducing profits and paying lump sums to workers will work. That profit sharing accompanied by greater selection of productive workers works does not mean that forced profit sharing will work for everyone -- someone employs the less productive, I hope.

If it's about incentives, then there should be a widespread Federal initiative to promote piece-work, commissions rather than salaries, independent contractors rather than employees... Hmm, we're headed the other way.

As economists, we are supposed to start with a problem. What is the market failure that stops companies form putting in productivity enhancing profit sharing programs? Or are they just too dumb and need the benevolent hand of the "bully pulpit" to educate them?

"Increased vocational training and apprenticeships for the non-college-bound," are more Orwellian subject-less sentences. Who is going to do this increasing and how? What is the market failure? Do we need to have triple digit numbers of Federal Job-training programs?

"Providing pre-k education" is another subject-free sentence. I presume he does not mean reducing regulations and union requirements so more pre-k schools can start up! That might actually be effective. But perhaps it is technically correct: a large Federal subsidy for pre-k education, funneled through the public school systems and teacher's unions will raise someone's wages. The "scholarly evidence" is not that it will be the kids.

The idea that forcing companies to pay out greater wages is the key to "stimulus," and that demand-side "stimulus" is the key to long-run growth is...er... even more novel economics.

In classic Keynesian stimulus, there is something about the government borrowing money and spending it, or giving it to consumers to spend, that causes people to forget that the borrowed money must be paid back someday. Not here -- this is directly the claim that taking from Peter and giving to Paul is the key to prosperity. And not just temporary stimulus, but long run growth.

One of many fallacies at work here is the notion that companies face a choice between "paper" investment and "real" investment; that by piling up cash reserves they are somehow diverting resources that could be "real demand" into "paper investments." But every paper asset is a paper liability, so this possible truth about an individual company makes no sense for an economy as a whole.

And let's follow the logic.  If this works for stimulus and growth, force companies to give away cash to consumers. Consumers are, well, people who like to consume. Force them to give cash away to thieves. They consume quickly.  If this is a bad idea.. well then maybe the whole "stimulus" thin is a bit of bunk as well.

Gordon at least has the decency to belittle the idea. And on "a shift in business income [another subjectless sentence -- this shift is forced by the Federal Government!] away from profits and toward salaries would create growth"  because "Workers are more likely to buy things from their paychecks than businesses are to invest out of their profits," one can hope that a statement which violates basic accounting is a misquotation.

 Krueger has less defense: "a more virtuous growth model,...which is driven by stronger wage growth...more consumption, more demand, creating more jobs" is a direct quote. It may be "virtuous" to feel this way, but the classic criticism of Democratic economic policy is doing things that make you feel good but don't work.

Well maybe, maybe not. Economics is a work in progress. But it is certainly brand-new, made-up-on-the spot economics, designed to buttress policies decided on for other reasons.

A last grumpy comment. The WSJ titled Blinder's oped, "Only one candidate can make wages grow again."  Actually I agree with the sentence   Like most media they forgot there are more than two candidates!

Macro-Finance

A new essay "Macro-Finance," based on a talk I gave at the University of Melbourne this Spring. I survey many current frameworks including habits, long run risks, idiosyncratic risks, heterogenous preferences, rare disasters, probability mistakes, and debt or institutional finance. I show how all these approaches produce quite similar results and mechanisms: the market's ability to bear risk varies over time, with business cycles. I speculate with some simple models that time-varying risk premiums can produce a theory of risk-averse recessions, produced by varying risk aversion and precautionary saving, rather than Keynesian flow constraints or new-Keynesian intertemporal substitution.

How to step on a rake

How to step on a rake is a little note on how to solve Chris Sims' stepping on a rake paper.

This is mostly of interest if you want to know how to solve continuous time new-Keneysian (sticky price) models. Chris' model is very interesting, combining fiscal theory, an interest rate rule, habits, long term debt, and it produces a temporary decline in inflation after a rise in nominal interest rates.  

Blueprint for America

"Blueprint for America" is a collection of essays, organized, edited and inspired by George P. Shultz. You can get an overview and chapter by chapter pdfs here. The hardcover will be available from Amazon or Hoover Press October 1.

Some of the inspiration for this project came from the remarkable 1980 memo (here) to President-elect Ronald Reagan from his Coordinating Committee on Economic Policy.

Like that memo, this is a book about governance, not politics.  It's not partisan -- copies are being sent to both campaigns. It's not about choosing or spinning policies to attract voters or win elections.

The book is about long-term policies and policy frameworks -- how policy is made, return to rule of law, is as important as what the policy is --  that can fix America's problems. It focuses on what we think are the important issues as well as policies to address those issues -- it does not address every passion of the latest two-week news cycle.

The book comprises the answers we would give to an incoming Administration of any party, or incoming Congress, if they asked us for a policy package that is best for the long-term welfare of the country.

The chapters, to whet your appetite:

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: The Domestic Landscape by Michael J. Boskin
IN BRIEF: Spending by George P. Shultz
CHAPTER 2: Entitlements and the Budget by John F. Cogan
CHAPTER 3: A Blueprint for Tax Reform by Michael J. Boskin
CHAPTER 4: Transformational Health Care Reform by Scott W. Atlas
CHAPTER 5: Reforming Regulation by Michael J. Boskin
CHAPTER 6: National and International Monetary Reform by John B. Taylor
CHAPTER 7: A Blueprint for Effective Financial Reform by John H. Cochrane
IN BRIEF: National Human Resources by George P. Shultz
CHAPTER 8: Education and the Nation’s Future by Eric A. Hanushek
CHAPTER 9: Trade and Immigration by John H. Cochrane
IN BRIEF: A World Awash in Change
CHAPTER 10: Restoring Our National Security by James O. Ellis Jr., James N. Mattis, and Kori Schake
CHAPTER 11: Redefining Energy Security by James O. Ellis Jr.
CHAPTER 12: Diplomacy in a Time of Transition by James E. Goodby
CLOSING NOTE: The Art and Practice of Governance by George P. Shultz

My chapter on a Blueprint for Effective Financial Reform is a better version of the talk on Equity Financed banking which I posted here. (The talk was based on the paper. Now you have the paper.)

My chapter on Trade and Immigration is new, and an uncompromising red-meat free-market view. I don't think one should compromise centuries old economic understanding just because it's not politically popular at the moment.
 
If you got this far, you might also be interested in my Economic Growth essay written for a parallel but similar project.

Immigration sentiment

Above, a lovely graph from The Conversation. A common story says that opposition to immigration comes from people in high-immigrant communities, who suffer externalities from the presence of many immigrants. It is not true.