Macro Musing Podcast

I did a podcast with David Beckworth, in his "macro musings" series, on the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, blogging, and a few other things.



(you should see the link above, if not click here to return to the original).

You can also get the podcast at Sound Cloud, along with all the other ones he has done so far, or on itunes here.  For more information, see David's post on the podcast.

Lessons Learned I

I spent last week traveling and giving talks. I always learn a lot from this. One insight I got:  Real interest rates are really important in making sense of fiscal policy and inflation.

Harald Uhlig got me thinking again about fiscal policy and inflation, in his skeptical comments on the fiscal theory discussion, available here. At left, two of his graphs, asking pointedly one of the standard questions about the fiscal theory: Ok, then, what about Japan? (And Europe and the US, too, in similar situations. If you don't see the graphs or equations, come to the original.) This question came up several times and I had the benefit of several creative seminar participants views.

The fiscal theory says
 \[ \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} = E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{R_{t,t+j}} s_{t+j} \]
 where \(B\) is nominal debt, \(P\) is the price level, \(R_{t,t+j}\) is the discount rate or real return on government bonds between \( t\) and \(t+j\) and \(s\) are real primary (excluding interest payments) government surpluses. Nominal debt \(B_{t-1}\) is exploding. Surpluses \(s_{t+j}\) are nonexistent -- all our governments are running eternal deficits, and forecasts for long-term fiscal policy are equally dire, with aging populations, slow growth, and exploding social welfare promises. So, asks Harald, where is the huge inflation?

I've sputtered on this one before. Of course the equation holds in any model; it's an identity with \(R\) equal to the real return on government debt; fiscal theory is about the mechanism rather than the equation itself. Sure, markets seem to have faith that rather than a grand global sovereign default via inflation, bondholders seem to have faith that eventually governments will wake up and do the right thing about primary surpluses \(s\). And so forth. But that's not very convincing.

This all leaves out the remaining letter: \(R\). We live in a time of extraordinarily low real interest rates. Lower real rates raise the real value surpluses s. So in the fiscal theory, other things the same, lower real rates are a deflationary force.

The effect is quite powerful. For a simple back of the envelope approach, we can apply the Gordon growth formula to steady states. Surpluses \(s\) grow at the rate \(g\) of the overall economy. So, in steady state terms,
 \[ \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t s_t} = E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1+g)^j}{(1+r)^j} \approx \frac{1}{ r - g} \]
\[ \frac{P_t s_t}{B_{t-1}}  \approx  r - g \; \; (1) \]
(and exact in continuous time). The left hand side is the steady state ratio of surpluses to debt. The right hand side is the difference between the real interest rate and the long-run growth rate.

So, with (say) a 2% growth rate g, and a 4% long-run interest rate r, surpluses need to be 2% of the real value of debt. But suppose interest rates decline to 3%. This change cuts in half the needed long-run surpluses! Or, holding surpluses constant, if long-run interest rates fall to 3%, the price level falls by half.

You can see the punchline coming. Long term real interest rates are really low right now. If anything, we're flirting with \(r \lt g\), the magic point at which governments can borrow all they want and never repay the debt.

With this insight, Harald should have been asking of the fiscal theory, where is the huge deflation? And the answer is, well, we're sort of there. The puzzle of the moment is declining inflation and even slight deflation despite all our central bankers' best efforts.

Pursuing this idea, there is a larger novel story here about growth, interest rates, and inflation.

Obviously, there is an opposite prediction for what happens when real interest rates rise. Higher real rates, unless accompanied by higher surpluses, will drive inflation upwards.

In conventional terms, looking at flows rather than present values, suppose a government that is $20 Trillion in debt faces interest rates that rise from 2% to 5%. Well, then it has to increase surpluses by $600 billion per year; and if it cannot do so inflation will result.

A similar story makes sense for the cyclical falls in inflation. What happened to our equation in 2008?  Surpluses fell -- deficits exploded -- and future surpluses fell even more. Debt rose sharply. Why did we see deflation? Well, real interest rates on government debt fell to unprecedentedly low levels. This really isn't even economics, it's just accounting. The equation holds, ex-post, as an identity!

To think a bit more about real rates, growth, and inflation, remember the standard relation that the real interest rate equals the subjective discount rate (how much people prefer current to future consumption) plus a constant times the per capita growth rate
\[ r = \delta + \gamma (g-n) \]
The constant \(\gamma\) is usually thought to be a bit above one.

With \(\gamma=1\) (log utility), then we have \(r-g = \delta-n\). The magic land of unbounded government debt can occur because government surpluses can grow at the population growth rate, while interest rates are determined by the individual growth rate. But population growth is tapering off, and must eventually cease, and bondholders prefer their money now. With \(\gamma \gt 1 \) ,
\[ r-g = \delta - n + (\gamma-1)(g-n) \; \; (2)\]
The new term is the per capita growth rate, which is positive, further distancing us from the land of magic.

More to the point, though, we now have before us the central determinant of long run real interest rates. Real interest rates are higher when economic growth is higher. And \(r-g\) rises when economic growth \(g\) rises.

So, going back to my equation (1), we actually had a puzzle before us. Higher real interest rates would mean lower values of the debt, and would thus be inflationary if not accompanied by austerity to pay more to bondholders. But higher real interest rates must come with higher economic growth, and higher economic growth would raise surpluses, helping the situation out. Which force wins? Well, equation (2) answers that question: With \(\gamma \gt 1\), the usual case (a 1% rise in consumption growth comes with a more than 1% rise in real interest rates), higher growth g comes with higher still interest rates r, and thus remains an inflationary force, again holding surpluses constant.

All in all then, we have the hint of a fiscal theory Phillips curve: Inflation should be procyclical. In good times, interest rates rise and the real value of government debt falls, producing more inflation. In bad times, interest rates fall and the real value of government debt rises, producing less inflation.

Central banks have been absent in all this. The natural next question is, does this provide another reinforcing channel by which central banks might raise inflation if they raise interest rates? I don't think so, but one needs more equations to really answer the question.

What matters here are very long-term real interest rates, the kind that discount expectations of surpluses -- yes, we need some surpluses! -- 20 to 30 years from now to establish bondholder's willingness to hold debt today.

In no model I have played with can central banks affect real interest rates for that long. I think a quick look out the window convinces us that central banks cannot substantially raise interest rates in a slump, with supply of global savings so strong compared to demand for global investment. Long-term interest rates really must come from supply and demand, not monetary machination. Higher real interest rates require higher marginal products of capital, and thus higher economic growth, not louder promises, more speeches, or more energetic attempts to avoid the logic of a liquidity trap.

Deflation Puzzle

Larry Summers writes an eloquent FT column "A world stumped by stubbornly low inflation"

Market measures of inflation expectations have been collapsing and on the Fed’s preferred inflation measure are now in the range of 1-1.25 per cent over the next decade.

Inflation expectations are even lower in Europe and Japan. Survey measures have shown sharp declines in recent months. Commodity prices are at multi-decade lows and the dollar has only risen as rapidly as in the past 18 months twice during the past 40 years when it has fluctuated widely

And the Fed is forecasting a return to its 2 per cent inflation target on the basis of models that are not convincing to most outside observers. 

Central bankers [at the G20 meeting] communicated a sense that there was relatively little left that they can do to strengthen growth or even to raise inflation. This message was reinforced by the highly negative market reaction to Japan’s move to negative interest rates.

So why is inflation slowly declining despite our central banks' best efforts? Here is a stab at an answer. I emphasize the central logical points with bullets.

• Interest rates have two effects on inflation: a short-run "liquidity" effect, and a long-run "expected inflation" or "Fisher" effect.  

In normal times, to raise interest rates, the central bank sells bonds, which soaks up money. Less money drives up interest rates as people bid to borrow a smaller supply, and less money also reduces "demand," which reduces inflation.  In the long run, higher inflation and higher interest rates go together, as they did in the 1980s.

However, we are now in a classic "liquidity trap." Interest rates have been zero since 2008. Money and bonds are perfect substitutes. The proof of that is in the pudding: the Fed massively increased excess reserves from less than $50 billion to almost $3,000 billion, and inflation keeps trundling down.

• In a liquidity trap, the liquidity effect is absent. 

The liquidity effect will remain absent as the Fed starts raising interest rates, and would remain absent if the Fed were to cut rates or reduce them below zero as other central banks are doing. You can't have more than perfect liquidity.

The Fed isn't even planning to try. It plans to keep the $3,000 billion of excess reserves outstanding and raise interest rates by raising the interest rate on reserves. There will be no open market operations, no "tightening" associated with this interest rate raise.  But even if it did, we're $2,950 billion of excess reserves away from any liquidity effect, so it wouldn't matter.

• When the liquidity effect is absent, the expected inflation effect is all that remains. Inflation must follow interest rates. 

Central banks thought they were raising inflation by lowering interest rates, following experience from the normal-times liquidity-effect correlation between lower interest rates and higher inflation. But that experience does not apply when its liquidity effect is turned off.

With no liquidity effect, lowering interest rates further below zero can only, slowly, lower inflation further. Central banks desiring inflation may have followed a classic pedal mis-application.

Do I "believe" this story? Belief has no place in science. It is the simplest coherent story that explains the last few years, not needing lots of frictions, irrationalities, and other assumptions. I have some equations to back it up. But we don't "believe" anything at least until it's published and has survived critical examination, replication and dissection. Still, I think it merits consideration.

Shh. I like zero inflation. If central banks have the wrong pedal but are driving the right speed anyway, why wake them up? Even Larry seems to have given up on the Phillips curve:

...suppose that officials were comfortable with current policy settings based on the argument that Phillips curve models predicted that inflation would revert over time to target due to the supposed relationship between unemployment and price increases.

There is no sign of the dreaded "deflation vortex," any more than there is any sign of dreaded monetary hyperinflation. We're drifting down to the Friedman rule. As Larry emphasizes, don't get excited over forecasts from models that rather spectacularly did not forecast where we are today. 
Central banks' desire for 2% inflation, and the Fed's rather puzzling interpretation of its "price stability" mandate to mean perpetual 2% inflation may also be relics of the bygone liquidity-effect regime. 

Appreciate the first half of the column which turns the signs around. It's a great bit of rhetoric.

I have to register mild disagreement with Larry's "solution" to the supposed "problem," 

In all likelihood the important elements will be a combination of fiscal expansion drawing on the opportunity created by super low rates and, in extremis, further experimentation with unconventional monetary policies.

He doesn't say which monetary policies would work, given they have not done so yet. But these are topics for another day.

(Note: If quote and bullet formatting doesn't show up, come back to the original.)

MacDonell on QE

Gerard MacDonell has a lovely noahpinion guest post "So Much for the QE Stimulus" (HT Marginal Revolution). Some good bits here, with my bold on noteworthy zingers.

The post is unusual, because practitioners tend to regard the Fed and QE as very powerful. But here he expresses nicely the skeptical view of many academics such as myself.

the Fed leadership has now abandoned its original story about how QE affects the economy and has conceded that the tool is weak

It has long been obvious that QE operated mainly through signaling and confidence channels, which wore off on their own without any adjustment in the size or composition of the Fed’s balance sheet....

Obvious to us skeptics, not to the Fed or to the many academic papers written trying to explain the supposed powers of QE

The story initially told by the Fed leadership starts with the claim that large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) [lower interest rates]... by removing default-free interest rate duration from the capital markets. ...

Translation: buying bonds to drive up bond prices

That story does not hold much water.

 

The theoretical foundations supporting QE were invented – or really revived from the 1950s [Preferred habitat theory]– in an effort to justify a program that had been resolved upon for other reasons. 

LSAPs did not actually succeed in reducing the stock of government rates duration because they were fully offset by the fiscal deficit and the Treasury’s program of extending the maturity of the federal debt. 

Translation: The Treasury sold as much as the Fed bought.

 And while the estimated term premium and bond yields did go down during the QE era of late 2008 through late 2014, they had a disconcerting tendency to rise while LSAPs were ongoing.

 Translation: When the Fed actually bought securities, yields went up.

Peak QE gullibility seems to have been reached in the late summer of 2012, with Ben Bernanke’s presentation to the Kansas City Fed’s monetary policy conference at Jackson Hole. ...

Evidence that the Fed doesn't believe it any more

...the Fed has abandoned the flock it once led. If the leadership still believed the official story, it could not promise both to maintain the size of the balance sheet and raise rates at an historically slow pace. That would deliver far too much stimulus, particularly with the economy now near full employment. The obvious way to square this circle to recognize that the Fed does not believe the story, which is an advance.

... according to the original story, little of this presumed stimulus would unwind without asset sales or a passive shortening of maturities, both of which have largely been excluded for now.

...Readers of this comment may recall those charts circulated by Wall Street showing the fed funds equivalent going deeply and shockingly negative after 2009. In retrospect, those charts are cringe-inducing and best forgotten. It is a mercy that the Fed has participated in the forgetting. 

This is consistent with my view. The large balance sheet is a great thing. Narrow banking has arrived. We live the optimal quantity of money. Interest-paying reserves generate zero stimulus, but great liquidity. Alas, the Fed, having touted the world-saving stimulus of QE, without qualifying that effects might be temporary, now is in a tough spot to turn around and say "never mind." All it can do is be silent and wait.

...This raises the question of why the Fed initially promoted a story that so obviously would not stand the test of time. We can imagine three possibilities...

The first possibility relates to the first round of event studies, which measured the immediate effects on the term premium and bond yields of QE-related news....

Announcement effects are a poor measure of fundamental effects that will endure long enough to affect the economy... markets typically act more segmented in the short run than over time,.... But smart and credentialed people argued otherwise and the FOMC may have been comforted by that.

I have puzzled at this as well. Many studies find price impacts of large unannounced trades. But price impact melts away. Why would we treat announcement effects as permanent -- as many Fed speeches did?

The second possibility is that the Fed wanted to raise confidence in the markets and real economy and thus chose to communicate that it was wielding a new and fundamentally powerful tool, even if Fed officials had their own doubts. ...

This is the "signaling" channel.

It is best to lift confidence with tools that have a mechanical force and do not rely purely on confidence effects. But if such tools are not readily available, then it probably does not hurt to try magic tricks and pyrotechnics.

Nice phrases. But..

The problem looking forward is that people may not be so responsive to the symbolism of QE next time around. ... Moreover, the Bank of Japan has got hold of QE, which raises the odds it will be properly discredited, if history guides.

OK, not very nice, but a good snark prize, as much to the B of J as to its many critics. But far more interesting..

The third possibility ..[is] that Bernanke and his colleagues in Fed circles were durably confused by Bernanke’s early and mistaken relation of the Quantity Theory to the efficacy of LSAPs...:

"The general argument that the monetary authorities can increase aggregate demand and prices, even if the nominal interest rate is zero, is as follows:..The monetary authorities can issue as much money as they like. Hence, if the price level were truly independent of money issuance, then the monetary authorities could use the money they create to acquire indefinite quantities of goods and assets. This is manifestly impossible in equilibrium. Therefore, money issuance must ultimately raise the price level, even if nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. .."

This is indeed the crucial point. In simple quantity theory thought, MV=PY, so you can raise M even at zero rates, and eventually PY must rise. But that's wrong, alas. V becomes undefined when the interest rate is zero, or money pays interest.  As Gerard explains,

... one must wonder if this misapplication of the Quantity Theory to LSAPs created in Bernanke and associates an excessive confidence in the efficacy of the program...

...Bernanke would later argue this point himself, and demonstrate it by paying interest on excess reserves, thereby by converting them from money to debt. Bernanke’s money injection actually had ZERO maturity. Or more to the point, it did not even happen.

Stop and savor just a moment. When the government pays interest on reserves, reserves become the same thing as overnight government debt. They are held as a saving vehicle, and have no "stimulus."

To be fair, I think Bernanke's point might hold if there were a huge QE, a clear promise to leave reserves outstanding when interest rates rise above zero, and then possibly future inflation might work its way back to current inflation. But exit principles that clearly state the large reserves will pay interest so as not to give future inflation undo the possibility.

Gerard leaves out, I think, the most telling mistake in the Bernanke quote,  "monetary authorities could use the money they create to acquire indefinite quantities of goods..." Monetary policy does not buy goods; it does not drop money from helicopters. Monetary policy only gives one kind of debt in return for another kind; roughly speaking making change, giving you two 5s and a 10 for each 20. Buying goods is fiscal policy, and fiscal policy can cause inflation.

Bottom line

...The Fed leadership has come a long way from believing that QE had something to do with the power of the printing press to a recognition that the program is a combination of an indirect and transitory rates signal, a confidence game, and a duration take out that probably achieved much less than was advertised. But at least the journey has been made....

I share this view.

To be clear, both my post and Gerard's are not really critical of the Fed. If "pyrotechnics'' helped, good. If QE is not "mechanically" that powerful, great, we all learn from experience. A large interest-paying balance sheet and silence is probably the best thing for the Fed to do right now.  This question is most important to academic and historical analysis, to learn  what causal mechanisms really did play out, and what will work in the future.

Swiss Deflation

The Wall Street Journal Monday Oct 19 offers a reflection on deflation in Switzerland.

"It’s as close to an economic consensus as you can get: Deflation is bad for an economy, and central bankers should avoid it at all costs."

I differ, as does Milton Friedman's "Optimum quantity of money." And my "who's afraid of a little deflation" in... The Wall Street Journal.

"Then there’s Switzerland, whose steady growth and rock-bottom unemployment is chipping away at that wisdom."

"At a time of lively global debate about low inflation and its ill effects, tiny Switzerland—with an economy 4% the size of the U.S.—offers a fascinating counterpoint, with some even pointing to what they call 'good deflation.' ”

Indeed. The 1970s had stagflation. Now we have the opposite, "good deflation."  The Phillips curve lives on in "consensus."

Switzerland also is a good case for just how powerless central banks are to do much about it.


I don't think there really is such a thing as monetary policy any more. Money and government bonds are perfect substitutes. At that point, central bank interest rate setting is the same thing as if the Treasury simply decreed the rate it will pay on government debt. When (if) the Fed raises interest on reserves, and Treasury interest goes up similarly, it will be just as if the Treasury announced it will pay 1% on short term debt. (p. 77-78 of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves or p. 6-7 ungated here makes this point with equations.)

But you have to be careful when you set a price. If you set the wrong price, you are either overwhelmed or starved with demand.

That's how I read recent events: The Fed talks about raising rates, a sea of foreign capital starts to want to buy US debt at that higher rate. The treasury is not offering an elastic supply -- they're setting both price and quantity. So with the interest rate fixed, the dollar goes up. Then the Fed has to back down. The Fed can't raise rates if it wants to.

Switzerland also taught that lesson when its central bank tried to peg to the Euro and was overwhelmed.

The decline in long-term interest rates

Source: Council of Economic Advisers

Long term interest rates are trending down around the world. And it's not just since the great recession and financial crisis. The same trend has been going on for decades.

The Council of Economic Advisers just issued an excellent report surveying our understanding of this question. A blog post summary by Maury Obstfeld and Linda Tesar.

(Many other interesting CEA reports here. Occupational licensing is next on my in box.)

The report is really well done, for explaining the economic issues in clear simple terms, but without hesitating to use a model and an equation when necessary. If you're wondering how to keep your undergraduate or MBA class (heck, your PhD class) busy this week, this report will do the trick.

There is some grumbling in economics circles about the CEA and what role it should play, between Sunday morning talk show cheerleader for the Administration's policies vs. providing dispassionate  economic analysis to the Administration and country. This kind of report is the kind of CEA I cheer for.

I won't summarize the whole thing. Maury and Linda's blog post blog post does a great job of that, and you should just go read it. A few comments however.

1. Surprise surprise, the trend is a surprise. Hence, beware our current forecasts. This is not a criticism, it's just a fact. The best forecasts have been wrong in the past. They may well be wrong in the future.

2. Said: "The long-term interest rate is a central variable in the macroeconomy. A change in the long-term interest rate affects the value of accumulated savings, the cost of borrowing, the valuation of
investment projects, and the sustainability of fiscal deficits."

Unsaid: The surprise decline in long-term interest rates has been a boon to financing deficits. Current deficit forecasts use the current forecast of a return to higher interest rates. If this forecast is wrong once again, and real interest rates on government debt continue at rock-bottom levels, this will be a boon to "fiscal sustainability." Of course, the opposite is also true: If a trend nobody expected and everyone expects to reverse does reverse, then countries with big debts are in trouble.

3. The long term graph makes nicely a point that's been on the back of my mind lately. People typically assume that long term bonds should pay more then short term bonds, because they are riskier. But that's actually a puzzle: most bond investors hold their money for long periods of time, for which long term real bonds are less risky. It's hard, in fact, to get most term structure models to produce an upward-sloping yield curve.

It was not always so. In the 19th century, short term yields were consistently above long term yields.

The difference, of course, is inflation. In the 19th century we were on the gold standard, as noted in the graph. So long term bonds did not have inflation risk.  So, if inflation continues to die, or if our central banks go on a price level target, we might expect the same pattern to hold again. Which would be great for financial stability too. Short term debt causes runs and crises. If long term debt were cheaper, the inducement to finance short would be less.

4. Uncertainty. A message you read loudly between the lines is, that we have very good theoretical understanding of the various mechanisms that can move the trend in interest rates up or down, we (meaning "economic science") have really very little idea of the quantitative force of various mechanisms. By masterfully explaining each mechanism, and then patiently reviewing the vast literature that comes up with hugely different numbers for each mechanism, the point is made clearly, though between the lines.

They might go further. For example, the section on term premiums (the long rate is the average of expected future short rates plus a term premium) cites the latest studies and plots a line, but no standard error or other uncertainty band around that line. As this is an area I've written papers on, I know where the bodies are buried. Term premium estimates come down to forecasting regressions of future bond returns on current variables. Such regressions have huge bands of uncertainty. All forecasts and decompositions should have error bars. The only problem is artistic, as honest error bars would dwarf the forecasts. Well,  knowing what you don't know is real knowledge.

5. Forecasts. On p. 26, after this implicit devastating critique of the state of knowledge, "To illustrate our analyses, we illustrate different approaches to forecasting the long-term nominal interest rate, as is typically done twice a year in the CEA/OMB/Treasury Budget forecast and midsession review." A process for coming up with a number follows. Clearly, the message of the previous 25 pages is that conditioning decisions on a forecast, cranked out to two decimal places, is a bad idea. Economic policy should embrace uncertainty!

This is really a big deal. Much of the illusion of technocratic competence driving our regulatory state is reflected in absurdly accurate forecasts. The joke goes, we know economists have a sense of humor, because economists use decimal points. I'd love to see a Federal Forecast Accuracy Act: All forecasts made by every administrative agency shall include measures of forecast uncertainty. The CBO will evaluate all forecasts after the fact, and agencies shall be penalized when reality exceeds the stated uncertainty bounds more than half of the time.

6. The CEA ain't buying "secular stagnation," in its perpetual "lack of demand" interpretation.  (As a fact, it's undeniable. The question is the diagnosis and treatment.)  See p. 38.

7. In a report whose summary sections are  Fiscal, Monetary, and Foreign-Exchange Policies, Inflation Risk and the Term Premium, Private-sector Deleveraging, Lower Global Long-run Output and Productivity Growth, Shifting Demographics, The Global “Saving Glut”, Safe Asset Shortage, Secular Stagnation?, and Tail Risks and Fundamental Uncertainty, it is perhaps a bit petulant to complain of left-out factors but I will mention one.

The "supply side" part of the analysis is limited to productivity growth. Higher productivity growth leads to higher real interest rates in equilibrium, and (these days) vice versa. But it takes time and transition dynamics to accumulate capital.

One hypothesis that I learned from Larry Summers is that today's production function needs a lot less physical capital to produce the same productivity. A 1930s steel mill is a lot of accumulated savings. Facebook has nothing but a basketball court sized building full of 20-somethings coding while wearing headphones, and a really cool food court. The company is worth billions but it took comparatively little accumulated savings to start it up. If technology moves so that human, rather than physical capital is the heart of the K in F(K,L), productivity growth may determine interest rates in the long run, but there are lower interest rates on the transition path. Larry:

Ponder that the leading technological companies of this age—I think, for example, of Apple and Google— find themselves swimming in cash and facing the challenge of what to do with a very large cash hoard. Ponder the fact that WhatsApp has a greater market value than Sony, with next to no capital investment required to achieve it. Ponder the fact that it used to require tens of millions of dollars to start a significant new venture, and significant new ventures today are seeded with hundreds of thousands of dollars. All of this means reduced demand for investment, with consequences for equilibrium levels of interest rates.

(This is an update, thanks to email correspondent who found the quote.)

Update: Steve Williamson reminds us all that there is no "the" interest rate, and that the rate of return on capital is both stable and much higher than government bond yields. There is a risk premium, and it's big, and it varies over time. Practically all macro and growth theory forgets this fact. Since I've spent most of my career emphasizing the size and volatility of the risk premium, I should remember this reminder in every blog post. Thanks for pointing it out Steve!

Feldstein on inflation

Martin Feldstein has an interesting Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, "Why the U.S. Underestimates Growth."

The basic idea is that inflation may be overstated, because it doesn't do a good job of handling new products. As a result, real output growth may be a bit stronger than measured.  Marty runs through a lot of sensible conclusions.

He doesn't talk about monetary policy, but that's interesting too. So what if inflation really is (say) 3% lower than we think it is, and therefore real output growth is 3% larger than it really is?


That would mean we are a lot closer to "normal" of course.

It would mean that we really have 0% nominal interest rates, 1.5% deflation rather than 1.5% inflation; +1.5% real rates rather than -1.5% real rates. That is about the ideal monetary policy. Flat nominal wages, so we don't have wage stickiness problems, slight deflation matching productivity increases and a positive but low real rate of interest. We live the Friedman optimal quantity of money. In addition, it means no inflationary distortions and fewer intertemporal distortions in the tax code -- no taxing interest.

The labor market is pretty much back to normal except for the labor force participation rate. The main sign of weakness is real output growth, and Marty suggests that might not even be there.

How should the Fed react? News that real output growth is stronger than the Fed thinks would be an argument to raise rates. News that inflation is weaker than the Fed thinks is an argument to lower rates. At conventional Taylor-rule parameters of 1.5 times inflation plus 0.5 times output gap, news that inflation is 1% lower and output is 1% higher means the lowering effect wins. So, in fact this is an argument to keep rates where they are and to continue basking in the Friedman optimal quantity of money for a while.

In fact, this strikes me as the main conclusion. As Marty points out, if real growth is stronger than we think, that doesn't mean it couldn't be stronger still. If real wages are really rising, that doesn't mean they couldn't be rising more. Weak labor force participation and total factor productivity are not much influenced by inflation measures.

McAndrews on negative nominal rates

Jamie McAndrews of the New York Fed has a thoughtful and clear speech on negative nominal rates and the benefits of currency. (Some previous posts on the subject here  here and here.)

A few high points:

1. Needed: anonymous electronic transactions.

Many (not all) negative interest rate proposals call for the elimination of currency. Currency is dying anyway due to the great advantages of electronic transactions. I bemoaned the loss of privacy and political freedom when the NSA, the IRS, and pretty soon Twitter and the Chinese Department of Hacking have a record of everything you've ever bought or sold. Jamie brings up another important point:

The anonymity afforded by currency transactions prevents a buyer from suffering from any actions taken after the transactions that could exploit the knowledge gained by the seller of the buyer’s identity. For example, identity theft, or theft of credit or debit card information, is avoided through the use of currency. This is an economic benefit that is distinct from valuing privacy from a civil liberties point of view. If currency cannot be used in transactions, buyers are at a disadvantage, and many otherwise beneficial transactions (not related to buyers seeking to engage in tax evasion or otherwise illicit activity) would not take place.

Anonymity has value in many transactions. Anonymity equals finality.

It's not hard to have anonymous electronic transactions. Stored value cards could work well as electronic cash. If regulators allowed it, it would be simple enough to set up a money market fund that allows anonymous investing. Regulators don't allow it.

2. Hysterisis of institutions and the lesson of the 70s


There are fixed costs in setting up many institutions that adapt to negative nominal rates. For example, the option to hold currency:

.. Often, the costs of holding currency securely, by having a safety deposit box or a vault, are fixed costs. Once one has a vault, or has rented a safety deposit box, the costs of storing additional currency in it, up to its capacity, is nil. This suggests that there is a dynamic element to the economics of avoiding negative interest rates: the longer the negative rates are expected to persist, and the lower they are, the more favorable are the returns to investing in a vault. Once the vault investment has been made, maintaining negative rates would likely become more difficult.

An even more far-reaching change that many have suggested would be the creation of a new institution to handle and store currency on behalf of others; this could dramatically reduce the costs of holding currency...

Jamie adds to the clever ways to synthesize zero rate investments, and a cost I hadn't thought of

For example, suppose that one holds a credit card under existing U.S. rules: one can withdraw funds from an account that is earning a negative rate, and pay one’s debt to the credit card company in advance of when it is due, earning a zero return during the prepayment period....

... if one were to receive a check from the U.S. government for a tax refund, one could simply put it in a safe place and earn zero interest on it during the time the check remained undeposited...

...leaving the check undeposited, much like the hoarding of currency, is a negative outcome for society. ... This may impose unexpected costs on the check writer, triggering unplanned overdrafts and associated charges...

...having talented individuals looking for these opportunities is a dead-weight loss to society. We would rather have them use their talents for more socially productive purposes.

We went through this once before. In the 1970s, pricing and financial institutions were set up with small positive interest rates in mind. It took a period of prolonged inflation to induce people to spend all the fixed costs to adapt to high interest rates, including widespread indexation, money market funds, interest-paying checking accounts, and so forth. In turn, the easing of these "frictions," quickly removed the hoped-for benefits of inflation. For example, prices and wages were sticky when there was less inflation. Turn on inflation, and once people put the effort in to index contracts, price and wage stickiness fade, and inflation has much less output and employment effect.

So, the same sorts of legal and financial investments that allowed an economy to adapt to high nominal interest rates can also allow it to adapt to negative interest rates -- at large cost, in time and effort, in rewriting contracts, and in foregoing many advantages of currency. But are we sure the benefits will not disappear at the same time?

3. Financial institutions and negative rates

The health of banks and many other financial institutions depends on earning a spread between what the institutions earn on their assets and what they pay on their liabilities. Negative rates can squeeze bank profits.

and a lot of non-banks too. There is a plausible channel here that negative nominal rates hurt a large swath of financial institutions -- at least until they rewrite all their contracts and persuade all their clients to accept negative rates. This is a channel by which lowering rates could hurt economic activity.

By the way, I learned that those negative rates aren't so negative,

..the central banks that have negative policy rates offer zero rates on many of their deposits from banks, imposing negative rates on the “marginal” deposits. In this way, commercial banks can, in general, charge their retail depositors deposit rates of zero and earn zero at the central bank on at least a large portion of their reserve holdings.

4. Speaking of cause and effect signs...

..people could infer [from a negative interest rate] that the central bank itself has low expectations for inflation and is lowering nominal rates into negative territory as a way to “ratify” the low expected inflation environment. Such an inference would complicate the central bank’s effort to achieve its objective because it could encourage and entrench the public’s expectations for deflation. That could complicate the potential exit from the negative rate regime

Maybe with abundant excess reserves, the Fisher equation is stable -- and that lowering nominal rates will cause inflation to decline. Jamie isn't quite ready to burn at the heretic's stake on this issue, but you can see him edging closer to the fire.

Banking at the IRS

A while ago in two blog posts here and here I suggested many ways other than currency to get a zero interest rate if the government tries to lower rates below zero. Buy gift cards, subway cards, stamps;  prepay bills, rent, mortgage and especially taxes -- the IRS will happily take your money now and you can credit it against future tax payments; have your bank make out a big certified check in your name, and sit on it, don't cash incoming checks. Start a company that takes money and invests in all these things (as well as currency).

Chris and Miles Kimball have an interesting essay exploring these ideas "However low interest rates might go, the IRS will never act like a bank." Their central point: sure that's how things work now. But with substantial negative interest rates, all of these contracts can change. It's technically possible in each case for people and businesses to charge pre-payment penalties amounting to a negative nominal rate.

Reply: Sure, in principle. Nominal claims can all be dated, and positive or negative interest charged between all dates.

But this did not happen in the US and does not happen in other countries for positive inflation and high nominal rates,  despite symmetric incentives, and at rates much higher than the contemplated 3-5% or so negative rates.  Yes,  with large nominal rates there is pressure to pay faster,  inventory cash-management to reduce people's holdings of depreciating nominal claims, but this pervasive indexation of nominal payments did not break out. The IRS did not offer interest for early payment.

More deeply, what they're describing is a tiny step away from perfect price indexing. If all nominal payments are perfectly indexed to the nominal interest rate, accrued daily, then it's a tiny change to index all prices themselves to the CPI, accrued daily. If "how much you owe me," say to rent a house, is legally, contractually, and mechanically determined as a value times e^rt, and changes day by day, then e^(pi t) is just as easy.

So, price stickiness itself would (should!) disappear under this scenario.

Price stickiness has always been a bit of a puzzle for economists. As the Kimballs speculate how easy it is to index payments to negative interest rates, so economists speculate how easy it is to index payments to inflation. Yet it seems not to happen.

So this point of view strikes me as a bit of a catch-22 for its advocates, who generally are of the frame of mind that prices and nominal contracts are sticky and that’s why negative nominal rates are a good idea to "stimulate demand" in the first place.  If we can have negative nominal rates and change all these legal and contractual zero-rate promises to allow it, then prices won't be sticky any more!   Conversely, I should be cheering, as it amounts to a broad push to unstick prices. That has long seemed to me the natural policy response to the view that sticky prices are the root of all our troubles. It would allow negative rates, but eliminate their need as well.

Alas, the world seems remarkably resistant to time-indexing all payments.